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Investing in Agriculturally-Led Growth: 
The Philippine Case 
James A. Roumasset 
University of Hawaii 
"Private Vices by the dexterous Management of a skilful 
Politician may be turned into Publick Benefits." 
The Fable of the Bees 
Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733) 
I. Introduction 
Much of the debate on the role of agriculture 
in economic development centers on whether ag- 
riculture should be taxed or subsidized. The clas- 
sical prescription for economic development is 
investment in industrial modernization financed 
by an agricultural surplus. Proponents of agricul- 
tural development have cautioned, however, that 
squeezing the agricultural sector will stifle the 
engine of growth and lead to economic stagna- 
tion (e.g., Johnston and Mellor, 1961; Krishna, 
1967). Instead, they have advocated the opposite 
policy of stimulating agricultural development 
through investment and subsidies to the agricul- 
tural sector. 
The 1980s witnessed a widespread recognition 
that either taxing or subsidizing agriculture wastes 
resources and reduces the incentives for invest- 
ment (see e.g. World Developme~~t Report, 1983 
and 1987). This leads to the conundrum that mo- 
tivates the present paper: how can agricultural 
development be stimulated without distorting the 
incentives for efficient resource allocation and 
investment? 
Section I1 below provides an approach which 
simultaneously promotes efficiency and 
agricultural growth by removing the barriers to 
specialization and trade. Section 111 provides an 
illustration of these principles in the context of 
impediments to agricultural development in the 
Philippines. Section IV develops principles for 
efficiency-enhancing investment and section V 
summarizes the policy guidelines. 
11. Must farmers be martyred for economic 
development? 
In much of the literature concerning the role 
of agriculture in economic development, the wel- 
fare of farmers must be sacrificed for the progress 
of the larger economy. This literature goes back 
at least to Preobrazhensky (1926), who proposed 
that a socialist state could capture an investable 
agricultural surplus. Similarly, in the Fei-Ranis 
(1961) model, taxing traditional agriculture or 
subsidizing the modern, nonagricultural sector 
transfers labor from low to high productivity 
employment. Either way, farmers are sacrificed. 
Even investing directly in agriculture stimu- 
lates economic development at the expense of 
farmers. Stimulating agricultural output lowers 
food prices and the real wage and simultaneously 
increases incomes available for nonagricultural 
goods. Agricultural investment thus provides both 
supply and demand stimuli to the modem sector 
but penalizes farmers with lower prices. Farmers 
can be compensated for lower prices by govern- 
ment subsidies directed at output and inputs such 
as fertilizer, pesticides, and seeds. But these pro- 
grams distort economic incentives by driving 
wedges between consumer and producer prices 
and by increasing tax friction due to the need for 
additional government revenue. 
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A theory more supportive of farmer interests, 
and therefore more suitable for agricultural 
economists and public agricultural agencies, is 
one in which agricultural development proceeds 
without depressing the prices of agricultural goods. 
The keys to maintaining agricultural prices in the 
face of increased production are good agricultural 
markets and govemment policies that facilitate 
trade instead of regulating and distorting it. If 
domestic markets are well integrated and intema- 
tional trading opportunities left open, then the 
benefits of greater production can be passed back 
to farmers as well as agricultural workers. Allow- 
ing farmers lo appropriate the benefits of their 
increased productivity also preempts farmer-led 
political pressure for import controls that would 
otherwise penalize consumers. Rural financial 
markets are also important so that farmer savings 
can be mobilized to fund investment. 
It is also not usually recognized that agricul- 
tural marketing activities themselves are legitimate 
income and employment generating activities and 
that marketing services are an increasingly im- 
portant part of economic growth as development 
proceeds. Under competitive conditions, the wedge 
between farm gate and retail prices represents the 
value added by product transformation over space, 
time, and form. Transportation, communication, 
storage, and agricultural processing facilities are 
all subject to economies-of-scale. This means that 
the per-unit prices of product transformation ac- 
tivities decline with development. However, the 
quantity of transformation services often increases 
by more than enough to offset the decline in per- 
unit price such that the value added by product 
transformation increases as a fraction of the retail 
price. For example, the per-kilometer cost of 
transporting a ton of rice may decline by 20 per- 
cent while the average distance that a ton of rice 
is transported increases by 30 percent, thus in- 
creasing marketing costs as a percent of retail 
price. Thus, increasing marketing margins are not 
pr imfac ie  evidence of inefficiency. They may 
be a reflection instead of the rapid growth of 
marketing services. 
Given the importance of agricultural markets 
to the welfare of both farmers and consumers, the 
appropriate focal point of agricultural develop- 
ment strategy is agricultural traders. As traders 
invest more in transportation, communication, 
storage, and processing facilities, the effective 
demand for farm goods increases and farmers' 
incomes rise. At the same time, the marketing 
industry itself becomes a new source of income 
and employment generation. Thus far from being 
the nemesis of farmers as he is so often portrayed 
by rent-seeking politicians, the trader is the 
farmer's best ally. 
Tall tales of trader "profiteering," "hoarding," 
conspiratorial collusion and exploitation are greatly 
exaggerated. Profit-seeking serves the essential 
social function of directing investment in agricul- 
tural marketing to where it will do the most good. 
"Hoarding" is nothing more than private storage, 
and storage serves the socially useful function of 
"transporting" commodities over time fmm sea- 
sons of surplus to seasons of deficit. If storage 
were banned under fully enforced anti-hoarding 
laws, price fluctuations would greatly increase, 
and shortages in deficit periods would be much 
more acute. 
Occasionally, traders in particular locations do 
manage to restrict competition and garner mo- 
nopoly rents. This only happens, however, when 
government policy helps to restrict entry, e.g. by 
prosecuting unlicensed dealers. Justice requires 
that the force of government be used to allow free 
entry of traders. This is all that is required to 
limit profits of middlemen to whatever cost ad- 
vantage they can maintain over the marginal 
traders. Sometimes when collusive cartel 
arrangements are investigated, it turns out that 
the police and/or other government officials are 
helping to enforce the cartel by harassing potential 
entrants. According to one story, trading at the 
Divisoria market in Manila is controlled by a 
cartel that pays the police to prevent potential 
competitors from unloading their trucks. It is not 
the "evil ways" of traders that must be attacked in 
these cases but the abuse of power by govemment. 
So long as commercial rights are vigorously 
maintained and freedom of entry is assured, pri- 
vate interests will be tumed to social good. 
Government also has an important role to play 
in the maintenance of a legal environment 
conducive lo the formation and maintenance of 
contractual relationships. This includes the pm- 
tection of truth in labeling and the enforcement 
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of product liability law. The potential for adulter- 
ating agricultural chemicals and safety hazards 
isoften used as a rationale for licensing agricultural 
suppliers. The licensing requirement, however, 
can easily become a barrier to entry and an 
invitation to graft. It is generally preferable to 
use the other instruments of the law to prosecute 
illegal trading practices. 
111. High Return Areas for Public Investment 
in Philippine Agriculture 
The key to efficiency-enhanced agricultural 
development is the support of the private agricul- 
tural marketing sector. This does not mean subsi- 
dizing existing agricultural traders, such as the 
alleged "rice cartel" in the Philippines, but in- 
are able to coordinate deliveries from ~ r a l  areas 
to distant European ports. In filling a particular 
European order, the trader will know how much 
cargo space to reserve on a particular vessel and 
will communicate to his rural operatives what 
quantities should be purchased and what prices 
the rural operatives are authorizedto cover. Reli- 
able telecommunications are critical to these op- 
erations. In the Philippines, one cannot even 
rely on even getting through on the telephone to 
the province. 
One of the constraints to developing better 
telecommunications in the Philippines is the 
granting of monopoly privileges to particular car- 
riers. There is no compelling case for obstructing 
competition in the telecommunications industry. 
Sheltering inefficient suppliers from competition 
creasing the productivity of the marketing indus- severely taxes the development of agriculture and 
try. Three specific areas deserving of support are: the service industries and also leads to excessive 
1) increasing competitiveness by removing gov- 
ernment-imposed barriers to entry, 2) removing 
economic policies biased against agriculture, and 
3) improving marketing infrastructure, especially 
communication and transportation. 
Agricultural development in the Philippines is 
still strained by unnecessary biases against agri- 
culture. There has been some progress in de- 
creasing taxation of export-oriented agriculture 
(especially in the coconut sector), some disman- 
tling of government-controlled marketing 
monopolies, and diminished tariff protection of 
manufactured import substitutes. Unfortunately, 
indirect controls on foreign exchange and foreign- 
debt financed deficit spending kept the exchange 
rate from being devalued sufficiently to confer 
expansionary benefits of trade liberalization to 
the export-oriented agricultural sector. Moreover, 
agriculture was also disadvantaged by a faster 
rate of liberalization which hurt the import-sub- 
slituting parts of agriculture such as livestock. 
Finally, agriculture's share of public investment 
declined even further to less than one-fourth of 
what it would be if public investment were allo- 
cated according to agriculture's share in the 
economy's gross domestic product (for further 
details, see Clarete, 1989). 
Getting agriculture moving in the Philippines 
will require improved telecommunication facili- 
ties. In Bangkok and even in Jakarta, private haders 
concentration of development in Manila. The 
Department of Agriculture has a strong mandate 
on behalf of farmers and also for the promotion 
of food security to deregulate telecommunications 
in order to promote agricultural marketing. If 
general deregulation is impossible, then limited 
deregulation may be arranged for the benefit of 
agricultural marketing centers. For example, sal- 
ellite communications facilities could be explored 
to provide limited telephone, FAX, and computer 
linkages specializing in the communication of 
agricultural information, orders and contracts. 
Another primary area for public investment in 
support of agricultural development is transpor- 
tation infrastructure. Since the Department of 
Agriculture does not have primary responsibility 
for road development, their role should be one of 
advocacy through the Department of Public Works 
and other parts of the government. The Depart- 
ment of Agriculture can play a potentially influ- 
ential role of advocacy by allying itself with 
other parts of the government with an interest in 
road development. For example, developing the 
road along the Western side of Bukidnon to 
Cagayan de Oro City would be very valuable to 
the military in helping to improve the peace and 
order situation and would also provide a market 
outlet for exporting the surplus from the rich corn 
area of Bukidnon. 
Irrigation is another appropriate way for gov- 
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crnmclit to support the infrastruc~urc of agricul- 
tural development. Irrigution i~ivestmc~it has fallell 
dramalically worldwidc, partly in rcspollse to 
lowcr prices of rice und olhcr grains. The declin- 
ing invcslmc~n is reflected in World Bank lending 
for irrigation. Thc 1:irgest drop i n  the rclalivc 
importance of irrigalio~i lending by the World 
Bank 1135 hccn in Southcast Asia. Irrigation lcnding 
in 1986-87 was 80 pcrccnl lowcr lhan in 1977-79 
and fell from 22 pcrccnl of lol:il lending to 7 
pcrcent ovcr the samc peritd (Lcvinc cl 31.. 1988). 
The Philippines has also i x c ~ i  undcrinvcsting 
i n  irrigation tluring thc s:lme period. EVCTI using 
low projcctcd long-~UII  prices bascd oil thc low 
prevailing ricc pricc in  1985-1986, Rosegranl el 
:11. (1987) found [hat new construclion would bc 
cconomically viable i n  many cases. Moreover. in 
its irrigalion inves~n~cnt plan for 1987-2000. NIA 
callcd (or a dramatic rcduclio~l in  irrigation in- 
ucstmcnt. At the same time, howevcr, target ar- 
ens for rchahilit;~tion wcrc increased by 13 pcr- 
ccnl. This sliifl in  priorilics is no1 justified by 
estimated ralcs of' return. Rosegrant ct al. find 
only very modcst rates oS refurti to both rehabili- 
lalio~i and rotational irrig;~tio~i. 
Studies of r:lle of return eslimatcs of new irri- 
galion systems, rehabililalio~i and intcrisified wa- 
Icr managemenl. show that thc performance of 
irriyalion inveslment varics considerably across 
pro!ccls. with a prcpondcr:uice of low rates of 
return. The imp!icatio~i is that there are largc 
polcnli;~l gains froni improved management at all 
lcvels of projcct design and implementation. in- 
cluding sitc selection, enginceriag design, watcr 
distribution, system rnaintetlancc and cosl rccov- 
cry. While communal systems io gcneral have a 
better record for controlling cost overruns and 
providing for sustainabilily, the "bottom-up" ap- 
proach docs not provide a completc answer. More 
efficient management will require greater devo- 
lulion of responsibility i l l  design, construc~ion, 
operation and maintena~lce of irrigation systems. 
Thc National Irrigation Authority should special- 
ize in  providing technical assistance lo local 
govcrnmenls. farmer organizations and private 
developers. Subsitlies for irrigation. above cost 
recovery from direct bcncficiaries, should he based 
on llic relative magnitude of indirecl hcnefirs and 
sho~!!d be coordinated lhrough the Ministry of 
Fi~iance. 
11 is ofle~l noted [hat the highesl rates ofrclur~i 
lo public investment in agriculture lie in the area 
of agricultural rcscarch. Cross-country studies 
report rates of return to agricullural research of 
40% and higher. While high rates olretur~i mply 
a gencral pattern of underinvestment across 
cou~ilries. Ihe rale of investment i n  agricultural 
rcsc;~rch is even lower ill lhc Philippines than in 
ollicr countries. In a study of South and Soulh- 
cast Asian countries. Pray and Ruttan (1985) Sound 
lh:il the Philippine invcstcd only .I6 percent ofils  
agricultural product in ugricullural rescarch. ~ h c  
lowest of 311 cou~llries revicwed. including Indo- 
ncsia. Thailantl. India. Pakistan. and Bangladesh. 
A1 the samc lime, reviews of the rescarch and 
extension programs i n  the Philippi~lcs suggest 
substantial incfficicncy i n  the composition of 
spending and in thc generation of notablc resulrs. 
Firsl. lhc allocalion of rcscarch and extension 
cxpc~~dilures is i~iortlinately biased in the direc- 
lion of cxlc~ision. cspccially give11 the paucity of 
c~iviro~~mcnt;~lly appropriate and eco~iomically 
viable products of agricultural research. Seco~id. 
the nllocalion of rcsearch expenditures has bee11 
biasctl lowards import-substituting producls such 
as collon, lobacco, and poultry and away from 
export products including sugar, pineapples. ba- 
nanas, citrus, fruits, and coffee (David, 1983). 
Third. rcscarch expenditures have sometimes been 
spcnl on the development of research facilities 
:ind procurement of equipment without commell- 
surate allcnlion to performance-based manage- 
men1 of rcscarch. While there is awareness of 
lhcse problems within the Department of Agri- 
cullure. much of (he aclion appears lo bc concell- 
(rated on orgat~izatiot~ building, priority setting, 
planning. surveying, program reviewing, and 
constructing acronyms ("FARMERS WEL- 
F A R E ) .  Mechanisms are needed lo channel 
available fu~ids on the basis of research results 
with a demonstrable economic benefit to farmers, 
agricultural workers, and consumers. This may 
mean greater emphasis on supporting agricul- 
tural research in the private sector and less em- 
phasis on centralized planning of research. 
Considered together, inveslment in agricultural 
research and infrastructure provides a clear picture 
of what is wrong with public support of agricultural 
! \ \ , I  \ I  I \ ( ;  IS A(;l<l('lll.'flJKALLY-L6D GROWTH 
~ l ~ . \ , t . l ~ ~ l ) ~ l l e t ~ ~ .  011  thc one hand, there is a strong 
,,I l t r t ( r  / i t i . i r .  ciisc that i~ivestme~lt in each of the 
. I I I . I I ; I S  is critic;~l for agricultural growth and ap- 
I I I I I I I I I ; I I C  101. puhlic sector support. On the other 
I I . I I I ~ .  I I ~ I T C  is some evidence that existing invest- 
I I I ( . I I I S  i l l  ro;~ds. irrigatio~~. and research have not 
1v.t.11 wclI-~~i;i~~agcd in the past. There is need for 
I I I I I I C  ~ I I Y C S I I I I C I I ~  i n  research irrigation facilities 
\ I I  :IS lo i~~crc:~se productive capacity and commu- 
I I I ~ . ; I I ~ I ) I I  : I I ~  lra~~sporlatio~l facilities so that farm- 
6.1 r \ \ , i l l  ulilizc the additional capacity and benefit 
I I I I I I I  i t .  At thc same time, it is critical that these 
~ ~ ~ v ( . s ~ n ~ c l i t s  he well-managed so that the poten- 
I I ; I I  rclurIis arc realized. 
Si~~ii lar  care must he taken to avoid central 
I I~ : I I I I I~ I I : :  of agribusi~iess developme~lt. Govern- 
I I I I . I I I  tlcvclopme~it agencies everywhere succumb 
I I I  1l1c icmplalion to "pick the winner," i.e. estab- 
1 1 \ 1 1  1)rioritics among alternative industries to tar- 
,*(.I lor rapid growth, and then subsidize the gov- 
1.1 I I I I ~ C I ~ I ~ I ~  favorite. This approach presumes that 
ct~vcrllmcnt can "lead" development much as the 
I kvclopmc~~t of Agriculture's LEAD program is 
tlt.s~)u~ctl o lead agribusi~~e'ss. But progressive 
~ . , . i ~ l ~ t ~ ~ n i c  development is the result of evolution, 
11111 cc~itr:~l design. Government can, however. 
I .n~l i~ :~lc  the growth of agribusitless by creating 
: I I I  cltvirol~ment that is supportive of many di- 
\.I .ISI.  enterprises and by maintaining the 
t 11111l1c1itivc for es that  promote the natural selec- 
111111 01' I I I ~ S C  e~lterprises that employ resources i n  
~ l ~ ( . i u  l~igllcst and best use. 
lllc 111osl important priority for improving the 
~uorl~~clivily of Philippilie agriculture is to im- 
I I I I C  legal i~lfrastructure and the gencral 
g I ~ I I I I ~ ~ L . I C ~ ; I ~  c~lvirollme~lt to enhance the ability 
0 1  illlrcl)rcncurs to negotiate and to execute 
: I ~ I ~ Y . I ~ I C I I I S  without interference. The currelit 
I I I I \ I I I C S S  climate is replete with interferelice with 
I I ; I I I I ~ ~ ; I ~ I O I I  (e.g. military and dissident 
t In,(  Il~oilits) and a plethora of government regu- 
I . I I I I I I I \  il~volvi~lg. for example. foreign trade, la- 
t u u  ; I I I ~  l;111d USC. credit enviro~lmental impacts, 
,11111 111c LISC of 11;1tural resources. These regula- 
I I C , I I \  C . ; I I I  l)c easily used as vehicles for political 
~ ~ . I I I I ~ I I : I ! ! ~  ;111d ci111 pervert freedom of exchange 
111111 : I I I  ~ ~ ~ v i r o ~ l r n c ~ i t  where commercial entrepre- 
11i.111 ~ I I I I )  is : I I ~  ill-bought privilege. 
I I I  111c 1)ul)lic scctor, the great need is tlot so 
much setting priorities among competing propos- 
als as establishing mechanisms of public admini- 
stration so that private interests are directed lo 
public benefits. This requires going beyond the 
sloganceri~lg of 'privatization" and "decentrali- 
zation."Privalization without competition and free 
entry will just convert public waste into private 
inefficiency. Similarly. decentralization is not a 
panacea, i f  local governments are accessing cen- 
tral funding subsidized through foreign assistance. 
Soulld public admi~listration requires that project 
be~~eficiaries be given some control over project 
design and operation, that they be responsible for 
financial viability, and that subsidies be given 
only in accordance with indirect benefits not cap- 
tured by primary users (Roumasset, 1989). 
IV. Investment Priorities, Selection Criteria, 
and Management Principles 
Leaving measurement problems aside, the best 
method of selecting priorities among alternative 
agricultural investments is benefit-cost analysis. 
Benefit-cost analysis is a method of estimating 
the illcrease in the value of productiotl induced 
by a particular vector of government expenditures. 
The basic method involves evaluating the induced 
changes in the vector of outputs through the use 
of shadow prices. Shadow prices of outputs 
measure the value of other goods forgone in or- 
der to produce an extra unit of a particular prod- 
uct. Shadow prices of inputs measure the value of 
output of other goods forgone by diverting a unit 
of a resource into the government e~iterprise. Due 
to inevitable distortions in the economy. resources 
diverted into government projects may be worth 
more or less than their market value - hence the 
term "shadow price." 
For a fixed allowa~lce for currcnt expe~iditurcs. 
that set of projects call be found that maximizes 
the sum of present values subject to the con- 
strail11 that the expenditure allowance is not cx- 
ceeded. All alternative algorithm i~ivolves ranking 
projects by their internal rates-of-retur~l (i.e. the 
discou~lt rate such that the present valuc of a 
project is zero) and going down thc list of ranked 
projects un t i l  the expenditure allowa~lce is ex- 
hausted. This approach is theoretically inferior to 
the present value criterion and has no particular 
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advantages to commend it. 
An important practical issue in applying bene- 
fit-cost analysis is adopting safeguards to limit 
the overestimation of project benefits and under- 
estimation of project costs. Irrigation projects, 
for example, are notorious for both types of error. 
Command areas typically turn out to be much 
less than were prescribed, water delivery is unre- 
liable, actual yield increases are smaller than those 
projected, and the systems depreciate faster than 
expected. Moreover, construction often is more 
expensive and takes longer than forecast. Output 
prices are also often forecast based on a sequence 
of past prices that is especially favorable to high 
estimates of future prices. Other pitfalls to avoid 
are the application of regional product multipli- 
ers (without a proper accounting of costs incurred 
in increasing the production of related goods and 
services) and low estimates of the shadow price 
of labor justified by the apparent underemploy- 
ment of unskilled labor. These pitfalls are best 
avoided by training programs that stress not only 
techniques of measurement but the meaning of 
project evaluation. 
In the face of apparently multiple objectives 
and measurement difficulties, many government 
agencies are replacing benefit-cost analysis with 
Delphi methods of project evaluation. The Delphi 
method is little more than a glorified popularity 
contest. Subjective methods are used to establish 
criteria, to weigh the criteria, and to assess the 
extent to which projects achieve the criteria. Even 
though the criteria may be interrelated (e.g. the 
generation of income, employment, and foreign 
exchange), the method does not contain a disci- 
plined way of inserting the structural relationships 
into the problem. Thus evaluators may make im- 
plicit assumptions about the consequences of 
projects that are either inconsistent or defunct 
and there is no corrective mechanism in the 
evaluation technique to correct such errors or to 
accord them less weight. 
In contrast, benefit-cost analysis contains a 
built-in theoretical structure about interrelation- 
ships in an economic system that provides 
consistency in the way various consequences of 
projects are estimated. It should be noted, how- 
ever, that benefit-cost analysis was not originally 
intended, nor is it well suited, as an instrument of 
central planning. Benefit-cost analysis was first 
used in the U.S. during the 1930s as a tool to 
scree11 out inefficient projects. If discounted ben- 
efits are less than costs, i.e. if the project's present 
value is negative, then diverting resources from 
the private sector will obstruct the allocation of 
resources to their highest and best use and decrease 
real national income. 
In the case of resources being provided to the 
Philippines on a subsidized basis, costs should 
reflect opportunities forgone to the national 
economy. If the subsidized funds can be transferred 
to the private sector, even subsidized resources 
should be reckoned at their full opportunity costs. 
Only if the subsidized resources are constrained 
to particular forms of public investment is there 
reason to calculate costs on the basis that the 
resources will be unavailable if not expended in 
those particular uses. In these cases foreign-as- 
sisted projects should place increased weight on 
employment and payments to low and middle- 
income producers, not so much on the grounds of 
income distribution but to decrease rent-seeking 
and "repatriation" of project income into private 
financial accounts abroad. 
Given the propensity of project present values 
to be overestimated, benefit-cost analysis, while 
appropriate for screening out inefficient projects, 
should not be regarded as a sufficient criterion 
for project approval. The management and incen- 
tive structure of the project should also be assessed. 
An effective way to avoid incentives that promote 
rent-seeking is to finance a large proportion of 
project costs from direct beneficiaries. If this is 
not feasible then other criteria are needed to 
evaluate the incentive structure proposed for ef- 
fective management. 
Another crucial criterion for the evaluation of 
public investment in agriculture is whether or not 
a strong case has been made that the government 
has a comparative advantage in serving the pro- 
posed capacity. The investment areas discussed 
above, including appropriate agricultural research 
and marketing infrastructure, can be clearly jus- 
tified as ireas wherein the government has an 
important role to play. 
Many of the agricultural investment projects 
currently being proposed at the provincial and 
regional level, however, do not carry with them a 
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clear rationale for public subsidies. For example, 
the International Development Cooperation Co- 
ordinating Office presently receives many requests 
for warehouses, cold storage, ice plants, and ports. 
All of these facilities are susceptible to control by 
local politicians for private gain. Under the Marcos 
administration, it was widely circulated that pub- 
lic warehouses were being rented out by public 
officials to private traders. The current clamor 
for storage facilities by local politicians may be 
partly due to the temptation to use these facilities 
in a similar fashion. There is no general rationale 
for public ownership of storage facilities. 
Government's role should be limited to provid- 
ing technical assistance in the design and 
management of such facilities. In the case of ports, 
special care needs to be taken to insure that access 
to port facilities is allocated without prejudice 
and privilege. Users should be charged in accor- 
dance with the marginal cost of using the port 
facilities, inclusive of "congestion costs" (i.e. 
recognizing that marginal costs rise rapidly as the 
maximum capacity of the port facilities is ap- 
proached.) 
V. Policy Guidelines: A Summary 
Agriculturally-led growth can be sustained by 
strategies that benefit fanners and which enhance 
efficiency generally. This can be done by im- 
proving the productivity of agricultural market- 
ing in promoting specialization and exchange. A 
three-pronged strategy for increasing producliv- 
ity of agricultural marketing is to: 1) increase 
competitiveness, 2) reform economic policies that 
are biased against agriculture, and 3) promote 
efficient public investments in marketing 
infrastructure and in agricultural productivity itself. 
The first criterion for the approval of proposed 
public investments in agriculture is whether or 
not the implied role of government is appropri- 
ate. In general, government coordination and fa- 
cilitation of agricultural infrastructure is an im- 
portant priority. Reliable communication is prob- 
ably the most constraining bottleneck, followed 
by transportation,then by agricultural research 
infrastructure and then by irrigation and other 
infrastructure. 
The second criterion regards sound project 
management. Only projects which have been 
classified as being potentially sound on the first 
two criteria should be subject to a third criterion 
regarding economic feasibility. Unfortunately, this 
third criterion receives primary attention in both 
theory and practice. 
Delphi-type methodsof selecting projects may 
be little more than aggregated opinions thinly 
veiled as objectively rational planning. Benefit- 
cost analysis is logically sound but is easily 
manipulated in practice. In addition to a project 
selection screen, the project proposal should 
contain a clear and conceptually sound rationale 
for government support and a convincing case 
that the project objectives are congruent with the 
mission and general priorities of the Department 
of Agriculture. Perhaps most important, a solid 
case needs to be made that the project will be 
well managed. 
Evaluation of a project management and ad- 
ministration plan should not be based on an as- 
sessment of the quality of the prospective mana- 
gerial personnel but on the incentive structure 
and safeguards against rent-seeking abuses. Where 
direct beneficiaries of the project can be identi- 
fied, as in e.g. irrigation projects, then they should 
be responsible for a substantial proportion of 
project costs. This will create a political voice for 
project efficiency and will promote participation 
in the operation and maintenance of the project. 
. . 
Where cost recovery from project beneficiaries 
is not administratively feasible, other efficiency- 
maintaining institutions can be adopted. Windfall 
profits taxes can be assessed on producers that 
benefit indirectly from government expenditures 
(e.g. rice millers that benefi! from irrigation 
projects). Surcharges on property and other taxes 
can be assessed on a regional basis in accordance 
with benefits of public expenditures and earmarked 
for specific uses. 
In summary, that which should be done under 
the auspices of central government is that in which 
the government has a comparative advantage and 
can execute well. Projects that are likely to in- 
crease private production and exchange should 
be explored further. Projects that substitute pub- 
lic control for private entrepreneurship (e.g. pub- 
lic marketing and storage facilities) and those 
that are thinly disguised programs of political 
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patronage should be discouraged. Economic fea- 
sibility should not be regarded as a sufficient 
condition for public sponsorship but merely as a 
screening device to cull projects that would divert 
resources from private employment into inefficient 
public enterprises. 
Finally, a healthy skepticism should be main- 
tained towards project that fail the test of eco- 
nomic feasibility but which are advocated 
nonetheless on the grounds of "poverty allevia- 
tion." One of the lessons of the East Asian success 
story is that the best enemy of poverty is economic 
opportunity. Agricultural growth has long been 
considered a centerpiece of "growth with equity." 
Increased agricultural production increases the 
welfare of workers both by increasing the demand 
for their services and by increasing the supply of 
the primary wage good (food). Increasing the 
productivity of agriculture also contributes to the 
reduction of temporary poverty by enhancing food 
security. Agricultural production generates income 
providing workers with the ability to purchase 
food and simultaneously helps to insulate pov- 
erty-prone regions from prohibitive prices in times 
of national food storage. In addition to the 
maintenance of free exchange (absence of 
mercantilistic privilege) and the promotion of 
agricultural development, the government can also 
foster enhanced opportunities and higher levels- 
of-living among lower income groups by pro- 
grams that improve education and health. It is 
not necessary to justify such programs on extra- 
efficiency grounds. Education and health are 
part of the basic infrastructure of progress and 
are fully within the economic mandate for "pub- 
lic works and institutions." 
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